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ESSAY
EXPOSING SUNSTEIN'S NAKED PREFERENCES
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Naked Preferences and the Constitution ' and subsequent articles,2
Professor Cass R. Sunstein argues that the Constitution requires legisla-
tures to pursue public values or common goods. From this republican
political theory, Sunstein argues for a theory of judicial review: when the
Supreme Court reviews the constitutionality of a legislative act, the
Court should ensure that the act does not reflect a mere "naked prefer-
ence," but rather reflects some public value or common good. This essay
questions the coherence of the concept of naked preferences by arguing
that preferences are socially constructed not only through the political
process as Sunstein suggests, but also through the judicial process. A
preference is never naked. Even if one were able to peel off each layer of
clothing and peek underneath, nothing would be there; a preference sim-
ply cannot exist without its socially constructed clothing.
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1. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) [herein-
after Naked Preferences].
2. Sunstein subsequently applies and elaborates his theory, first fully introduced and devel-
oped in Naked Preferences, supra note 1; in Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Sunstein, Legal Interference with
Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Interference]; in
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lochner's Leg-
acy]; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988), [hereinafter Sunstein,
Republican Revival]. Sunstein introduced the foundations for his approach in Sunstein, Public Val-
ues, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv. 127. Bruce Ackerman
and Frank Michelman have developed similar approaches. See, eg., Ackerman, Beyond Carolene
Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 740-46 (1985) (the Court must define substantive values as well as
policing the political process); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE L.J. 1013, 1030 (1984) (judicial review meant to ensure that "normal politics" does not sub-
vert constitutional values of the people); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Self-Government]; Michelman, Law's Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (republicanism is a political form that can reconcile self-government and
government by law) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic].
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Part II of this essay describes Sunstein's theory of naked preferences
and relates it to its historical roots, the theories of Alexander Bickel and
John Hart Ely. 3 Part III criticizes the concept of naked preferences as a
basis for judicial review, and then discusses Sunstein's reluctance to ac-
cept fully the insight that all preferences are social constructs. 4 Part IV
suggests how this insight may turn us towards a reconstructed vision of
constitutional law. By combining Sunstein's theory with Bickel's the-
ory-pushed in a postmodern direction-constitutional adjudication is
recognized as a deliberative process or practice in which the Court par-
ticipates with others in the construction and reconstruction of values,
culture, and community. The Court's task is interpretive, requiring it
simultaneously to search for and to create meaning.5
II. SUNSTEIN'S THEORY OF NAKED PREFERENCES
Sunstein's theory of naked preferences can be understood as a com-
bination of Alexander Bickel's early theory of judicial review6 and John
Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement. 7 According to
Bickel's theory, the Court injects principles or enduring values into gov-
ernment. The legislative process, in Bickel's view, is a wide-open plural-
ist system, a clash of interests open to everyone and controlled by shifting
majorities; legislative actions generally reflect the most expedient means
for solving problems and attaining goals. 8 The institutional role of the
Court therefore stands distinct from that of the legislature. The legisla-
tive role is to allow the free play of democracy, whereas the judicial role
is to inject principles into government. Without the Court, our govern-
ment largely would lack enduring values.9
3. See infra text accompanying notes 6-28.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 29-75.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 76-100.
6. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter A. BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH] (lst edition published in 1962). Compare id. at 49-59 (Supreme
Court should develop and enforce neutral principles) with A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99, 165 (1978 ed.) [hereinafter A. BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS] (1st edition
published in 1970) (questions the possibility of finding neutral principles). See generally Wright,
Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971)
(criticizing Bickel's transition).
7. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-104 (1980).
8. A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 6, at 24-25, 225-26; see A. BICKEL,
IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 6, at 37 & n.*.
9. Bickel wrote:
Our point of departure, like Mr. Wechsler's, has been that judicial review is the principled
process of enunciating and applying certain enduring values of our society. These values
must, of course, have general significance and even-handed application. When values con-
flict-as they often will-the Court must proclaim one as overriding, or find an accommo-
dation among them. The result is a principle, or a new value, if you will, or an amalgam of
values, or a compromise of values; it must in any event also have general significance and
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Ely's representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review rejects
Bickel's vision of the judicial role as shaping and enforcing substantive
principles. Ely argues instead that all substantive value decisions must
be made through the democratic process.10 Although generally agreeing
with Bickel's pluralist model of politics as a clash of interests, Ely insists
that sometimes the democratic process is neither open to everyone nor
controlled by freely shifting majorities. The Court's role, therefore, is to
police the democratic process. The Court, in other words, does not seek
to inject principles or enduring values into government. Instead, the
Court clears the channels of political change and helps ensure the repre-
sentation of minorities, who traditionally are not represented in our dem-
ocratic process. Thus, for example, the Court will overturn a legislative
action infected with discriminatory intent-a defect in the democratic
process-but the Court will not overturn an action merely because it has
discriminatory effects.l
Sunstein's theory of naked preferences retains Ely's vision of the
Court as policing the democratic process, but reintroduces Bickel's em-
phasis on principles. Sunstein, however, does not argue, as Bickel does,
that the Court should define and enforce substantive values. Instead,
Sunstein envisions a legislative process that injects principle into govern-
ment; the Court polices legislative actions to ensure that they are princi-
pled and not the result of mere naked preferences.1 2
Hence, Sunstein's theory of judicial review is based on a distinct
political theory, which he explicitly contrasts with the competing theory
of pluralism. Pluralism views the political process as a clash of self-inter-
ested individuals and groups, all seeking no more than their own satisfac-
tion through the exercise of raw political power. Legislators simply
respond to the private interests of their constituents, and if such a thing
even-handed application. For, again, the root idea is that the process is justified only if it
injects into representative government something that is not already there; and that is prin-
ciple, standards of action that derive their worth from a long view of society's spiritual as
well as material needs and that command adherence whether or not the immediate out-
come is expedient or agreeable. It follows, and I take it Mr. Wechsler suggests, that once
the Court has arlived at a principle, it must apply that principle without compromise.
Therefore, the Court should not rest judgment on a "principle" which may be incapable of
uniform application.
A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 6, at 58 (citing Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Rtv. 1 (1959)).
10. See J. ELY, supra note 7, at 43-104.
11. Id. at 73-179; see, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232, 239 (1976) (written test for
District of Columbia police force had discriminatory impact upon African-American applicants, yet
was held constitutional because of failure to allege and prove intentional discrimination).
12. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1692-93 & n.26 (rejects Ely because principles or
values are important in constitutional decision making).
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as a public interest exists, then it is constituted merely by the aggregation
of private interests. 13
Sunstein's political theory-a form of republicanism-rejects this
pluralist vision of the political process. His theory is premised instead
upon the existence of public values or common goods that are beyond the
mere aggregation of private interests. The political process is "one of
collective self-determination." 14 Legislators deliberate and discuss an is-
sue until they together reach a solution that reflects public values. Sun-
stein defines public value tautologically as "any justification for
government action that goes beyond the exercise of raw political
power."15 Thus, the legislature should not distribute resources or oppor-
tunities in response to raw political power, or in other words, legislative
actions should not result from mere naked preferences.16 Sunstein
writes:
When a naked preference is at work, one group or person is treated
differently from another solely because of a raw exercise of political
power; no broader or more general justification exists. For example,-
state A may treat its own citizens better than those of state B-say, by
requiring people from state B to pay for the use of the local parks-
simply because its own citizens have the political power and want bet-
ter treatment. 17
Sunstein derives his theory of judicial review from this republican
political theory.18 The institutional role of the Court is to insure that
legislative actions do not result from mere naked preferences and instead
that they instead reflect public values. Sunstein characterizes this re-
quirement as a minimal but nonetheless significant constraint on the leg-
islative process. If no more than a naked preference justifies or motivates
a legislative action, then the Court must hold the action unconstitutional,
but if a public value justifies or motivates the legislative action, then the
13. Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1693-95.
14. Id. at 1694.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1689, 1693; see Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2, at 31-32, 58.
17. Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1693. Ronald Dworkin endorses a similar vision of
politics. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 173-75, 211 (1986). Sunstein has articulated four princi-
ples of what he calls "liberal republicanism": deliberation in politics, equality of political actors,
universalism, and citizenship. See Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1541, 1548-58. For
a criticism of the so-called republican revival, see Fallon, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695, 1727-30 (1989).
18. Sunstein traces the historical roots of his political theory to what he calls civil or Madis-
onian republicanism. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1690-91. In a subsequent article, he
elaborates Madisonian republicanism as a synthesis of classical republicanism and pluralism. See
Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2, 33-48.
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Court must find it constitutional. 19 Consequently, as with Ely's process-
based theory, Sunstein's theory suggests that the effects of a legislative
action are not subject to judicial inquiry-except insofar as they evidence
improper legislative motives or, in Sunstein's words, naked preferences.
20
Sunstein illustrates the application of his theory in the context of the
equal protection clause.21 Under equal protection doctrine, if a statute
discriminates on its face against a racial minority, then the Court reviews
the law under a strict scrutiny standard. 22 This high level of judicial
inquiry is justified, according to Sunstein, because the facial discrimina-
tion of the law provides strong evidence that the law reflects the raw
political power of whites, not the pursuit of some public value.23 Strict
scrutiny is also appropriate if a plaintiff alleges and proves that a facially
neutral law resulted from racially discriminatory intent-that is, the law
reflects a naked preference rather than a public value.24 Yet, even in
instances that lack clear evidence of improper legislative motive, the
Court still requires at least a rational basis for any law.25 This highly
deferential rationality standard provides, according to Sunstein, a clear
example of the prohibition against naked preferences: no law can be jus-
tified by raw political power. The legislative act satisfies the rational ba-
sis test only if it can be justified by some public value, a minimal
requirement that may be easily satisfied, but a requirement nonetheless.
26
19. In some contexts, this minimal requirement is supplemented by additional and sometimes
more controversial constitutional contraints upon legislative action. See Naked Preferences, supra
note I, at 1698-1704.
20. See id. at 1690, 1714; supra text accompanying note 11. Michelman adds that the Court
should police the political process by assuring that the community is open to presently excluded
voices, thus encouraging an on-going and vigorous dialogue on public values. See Michelman, Law's
Republic, supra note 2, at 1524-37.
21. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1; See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1710-17. Besides the
equal protection clause, Sunstein further illustrates the application of his theory in the context of five
additional constitutional provisions: the commerce, privileges and immunities, due process, con-
tract, and eminent domain clauses. See id. at 1704-27.
22. Under the strict scrutiny standard, such a law can be justified only if it is necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental purpose. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11, 12 (1967)
(an anti-miscegenation law was unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny standard).
23. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1710-11. Sunstein characterized this prohibition of
racial discrimination as the "strong version" of his theory of naked preferences. Id. at 1712.
24. See, eg., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (African-American plaintiffs alleged and
proved that an at-large voting scheme was intended to dilute their voting strength); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (written test for the District of Columbia police force had a discrimina-
tory impact upon African-American applicants, yet was held constitutional because of failure to
allege and prove intentional discrimination).
25. Under the rational basis test, a law can only be justified if it is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (law
preventing opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without prescription from an optometrist or
ophthalmologist survived rational basis review).
26. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1713-14.
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For example, in the case of Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 27 the
Court held that a law preventing opticians from fitting or duplicating
lenses without a prescription from an optometrist or ophthalmologist
survived a rational basis review under the equal protection clause. Sun-
stein argues that the Court's decision was based on the finding that the
legislative action was motivated by a public value-protecting consum-
ers-not merely by a naked preference-transferring wealth from opti-
cians to optometrists and ophthalmologists. Since a public value, not
merely a naked preference, motivated enactment of the law, the Court
found the law constitutional.2 8
III. EXPOSING SUNSTEIN's NAKED PREFERENCES
Sunstein conceives of naked preferences as "preexisting private in-
terests,"' 29 exogenous to social influences and autonomously chosen by
individuals.30 These naked preferences provide Sunstein with Archime-
dean points31 for his constitutional theory because they allow him to in-
flate substantive value judgments with an air of neutrality and
objectivity. For example, Sunstein argues that some values are "truly"
public values,32 Lochner v. New York 33 was "wrongly" decided, 34 and
some private preference structures have "defects. '35 More important,
these preexisting naked preferences also allow Sunstein similarly to in-
flate judicial review. Sunstein argues that the Court decides constitu-
tional issues by answering the following question: "Was the legislative
action the result of naked preferences or public values?" Naked prefer-
ences simply exist and thus provide, according to Sunstein's theory, neu-
tral and objective Archimedean points for the Court's decisions. 36 Public
values are socially constructed through a deliberative process, as Sun-
stein argues,37 but private preferences are not socially constructed: they
27. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
28. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1713,
29. Id.
30. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2; Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 2; see Na-
ked Preferences, supra note 1.
31. See generally R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HER-
MENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 8, 18 (1983) (argues that the search for an Archimedean point to ground
objectivity upon has dominated western philosophy since the time of Descartes).
32. Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1731.
33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34. Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 2, at 51; see also Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra
note 2, at 912.
35. Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 2, at 1131; see also id. at 1136 (some preferences
are "nonautonomous," which suggests that some are autonomous); id. at 1150 (some preferences are
the product of "distortion," which suggests thatsome are undistorted).
36. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 906.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
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are "preexisting" and identifiable as such by the Court. When the Court
reviews a legislative action, it searches for a preexisting private prefer-
ence, and if it spots one, it plants a red flag and declares the legislative act
unconstitutional.
The problem is that naked preferences simply do not exist: they are
social constructs, defined in part by the Court in its practice of constitu-
tional adjudication. Indeed, all values, perceptions, and expressions are
social constructs; they are created and exist through social relations and
culture, including language.38
In Kuhnian terminology, we all experience and perceive reality
through various paradigms-world views-and those paradigms consist
of structures that are socially constructed or created.39 Within any cul-
ture and community, the paradigms and their constituent structures an-
tedate and thus preexist each person's birth; the society already exists
before any particular person joins it. Consequently, the societal para-
digms are, in a sense, given to each individual as he or she is born into,
matures, and is socialized within a community. As a person develops,
the preexisting and given societal paradigms and structures shape the
person's world and limit his or her imagination of alternative worlds.4°
38. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 34-46 (1967).
The notion that values, perceptions, and expressions are social constructs is founded on the insight
that humans are social beings. For the classic treatments of this insight, see Marx, On the Jewish
Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 42.46 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978); M. WEBER, ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY (Gi. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1978). Berger and Luckmann argue that even apparently
organic functions are socially constructed: "[S]ocial reality determines not only activity and con-
sciousness but, to a considerable degree, organismic functioning. Thus such intrinsically biological
functions as orgasm and digestion are socially structured." P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra, at
182.
39. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-13 (2d ed. 1970). Kuhn ar-
gues that science operates within paradigms. Id. at 23-31. Most periods of scientific research are
characterized by "normal science," when the scientific community accepts one paradigm and ex-
plores questions within that dominant framework. Experimental data that is inconsistent with the
accepted paradigm is ignored or obscured so as not to disrupt the world view of the community. At
certain moments of crisis, however, a revolution occurs in the scientific community: the old para-
digm is replaced by a new one, which accounts for much of the previously inconsistent data. The
scientific community then resumes "normal science," but now it is operating in a new paradigmatic
framework.
40. Berger and Luckmann argue that when children develop and are socialized within particu-
lar social institutions, the social institutions have the quality of objectivity because they have "a
reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact." P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN,
supra note 38, at 58; see id. at 131. Kuhn's example of the "black four of hearts experiment" starkly
illustrates the power of a paradigm. In that experiment, subjects were asked to identify playing cards
from what appeared to be an ordinary deck. The deck, however, was not ordinary: it contained
anomalous cards such as the black four of hearts. Because of their paradigmatic expectations,
though, the subjects consistently failed to recognize the anomalous cards for what they "really"
were. See T. KUHN, supra note 39, at 62-65, 112-13. John Elster's argument that people adapt their
preferences to what they see as possible also supports the argument that all values and perceptions
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For example, a child learns through various social interactions the defini-
tion of being a police officer. An officer wears a certain type of uniform,
carries a gun, drives a special car, and performs certain tasks. These
characteristics of being a police officer shape the child's conception of the
role of officers in the community. If the child wishes to become a police
officer one day, she will have to fit within this given role because to imag-
ine an officer existing in a different manner may be difficult if not impos-
sible. In short, the paradigmatic structures of being a police officer shape
and limit the child's world. 41
Yet all paradigmatic structures are social constructs that arise and
exist only through localized instances of acting and communicating:
They are human artifacts. That is, various practices-including constitu-
tional adjudication-constantly constitute and reconstitute the culture
and community. Without those human practices, the socially con-
structed paradigms would not exist.42 To return to the example of a po-
are socially limited, although Elster does not push his argument to this conclusion. See J. ELSTER,
SOUR GRAPES (1983).
41. Berger and Luckmann offer an example of the social definition of hunting.
There will be, say, a vocabulary designating the various modes of hunting, the weapons to
be employed, the animals that serve as prey, and so on. There will further be a collection
of recipes that must be learned if one is to hunt correctly. This knowledge serves as a
channeling, controlling force in itself, an indispensable ingredient of the institutionalization
of this area of conduct. As the institution of hunting is crystallized and persists in time, the
same body of knowledge serves as an objective (and, incidentally, empirically verifiable)
description of it. A whole segment of the social world is objectified by this knowledge.
There will be an objective "science" of hunting, corresponding to the objective reality of
the hunting economy ....
[T]he same body of knowledge is transmitted to the next generation. It is learned as
objective truth in the course of socialization and thus internalized as subjective reality.
This reality in turn has power to shape the individual. It will produce a specific type of
person, namely the hunter, whose identity and biography as a hunter have meaning only in
a universe constituted by the aforementioned body of knowledge as a whole ....
P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 38, at 66-67 (emphasis in original).
Generalizing, Berger and Luckmann add:
An institutional world, then, is experienced as an objective reality. It has a history
that antedates the individual's birth and is not accessible to his biographical recollection.
It was there before he was born, and it will be there after his death. This history itself, as
the tradition of the existing institutions, has the character of objectivity. The individual's
biography is apprehended as an episode located within the objective history of the society.
The institutions, as historical and objective facticities, confront the individual as undenia-
ble facts. The institutions are there, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he
likes it or not. He cannot wish them away. They resist his attempts to change or evade
them. They have coercive power over him, both in themselves, by the sheer force of their
facticity, and through the control mechanisms that are usually attached to the most impor-
tant of them.
Id. at 60. Paradigmatic structures nonetheless are contingent and do change. See H. GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD (1975); T. KUHN, supra note 39.
42. Berger and Luckmann write: "Reality is socially defined. But the definitions are always
embodied, that is, concrete individuals and groups of individuals serve as definers of reality." P.
BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 38, at 116 (emphasis in original). See generally R. BERN-
STEIN, supra note 31; Rabinow & Sullivan, The Interpretive Turn: Emergence ofan Approach, in
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENE-A READER 1 (P. Rabinow & W. Sullivan eds. 1979). Richard
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lice officer,43 without a multitude of existing human practices, the
currently accepted definition of being an officer would differ. The defini-
tion is socially contingent; indeed, police officers do not exist at all in
some societies. 44
Consequently, in constitutional adjudication, the question whether a
legislative action is based on either a naked preference or a public value
does not have a neutral, objective, and preexisting answer. Instead, the
Court, as well as the rest of the culture and community, constantly is
defining and redefining the meanings of naked and public preferences.
And because naked preferences are not preexisting---exogenous to social
influences and autonomously chosen by individuals-Sunstein's theory of
judicial review, lacking the support of its foundation, shudders, groans,
and ultimately collapses.
For example, in the context of equal protection, when the Court
found in Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.45 that the law preventing opti-
cians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription was based
on the public value of protecting consumers and not on the naked prefer-
ence of transferring wealth from opticians to optometrists and ophthal-
mologists, 46 the Court's decision did not rest firmly on a neutral and
objective foundation. It is not self-evident that this law did not arise
solely from a desire to transfer wealth. And more important, it also is
not self-evident that a desire to transfer wealth from opticians to optome-
trists and ophthalmologists is a preexisting naked preference while the
protection of consumers is a public value. To the contrary, the Court
shapes our meaning of naked preferences and public values as it decides
the case: only after the Court's decision does it become clear that pro-
tecting consumers with such a law is a public value, not a naked
preference.
Moreover, the Court can shape the definitions of naked preferences
and public values so that the transfer of wealth can also be a public value,
Bernstein writes: "[P]rejudgments and prejudices have a threefold temporal character: they are
handed down to us through tradition; they are constitutive of what we are now (and are in the
process of becoming); and they are anticipatory-always open to future testing and transformation."
R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 140-41.
43. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
44. For example, in his study of the criminal law in eighteenth-century England, Douglas Hay
notes that a regular police force did not exist. Hay adds:
In place of police, however, propertied Englishmen had a fat and swelling sheaf of laws
which threatened thieves with death. The most recent account suggests that the number of
capital statutes grew from about 50 to over 200 between the years 1688 and 1820. Almost
all of them concerned offenses against property.
Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE 18 (1975). Hay argues,
however, that few people were actually executed for crimes against property.
45. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
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not a naked preference. This possibility shows most prominently in the
jurisprudence of substantive due process. In Lochner v. New York, 47 the
Court, according to Sunstein, effectively found that a law restricting the
hours of employees in bakeries stemmed from a naked preference. The
New York law, according to this reasoning, merely transferred wealth
from employers to employees and thus was unconstitutional under the
due process clause.48 But as Sunstein acknowledges, from 1937 onward,
the Court viewed similar laws that transferred wealth as as efforts to pur-
sue public values, not naked preferences.4 9 The Court thus had helped to
transform such a wealth transfer from a naked preference into a public
value, at least under the due process clause.
An inconsistency between Sunstein's discussions of equal protection
and Williamson, on the one hand, and due process and Lochner, on the
other hand, reflects his unwillingness to accept that the Court itself helps
to define and redefine what constitutes a naked preference and what con-
stitutes a public value. According to Sunstein's discussion of William-
son, a law that merely transfers wealth is unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause because it is grounded on a naked preference.
Yet, according to Sunstein's discussion of Lochner and post-Lochner
cases, a similar transfer of wealth can be constitutional under the due
process clause because it is grounded on a public value. Thus, Sunstein's
analysis suggests that during the same historical period, wealth transfers
may simultaneously reflect naked preferences and public values. If, how-
ever, Sunstein's characterization of naked preferences were correct-if
naked preferences were exogenous to social influences and identifiable as
such by the Court-then such an inconsistency could not exist. If a
wealth transfer were a naked preference in Sunstein's sense of the word,
then it must always be a naked preference. According to Sunstein's
scheme, a wealth transfer cannot be judicially or socially redefined to be
a public value.
This analysis shows that naked preferences as well as public values
are social and judicial constructs. Constitutional adjudication is as much
a deliberative process or practice as is legislative action. The entire com-
munity, including the Court, constantly constructs and reconstructs our
culture (and community), including the meanings of naked preferences
and public values.50 Thus, as discussed above, 51 the transfer of wealth is
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. U.S. CONsTr. amend. XIV, § 1; see Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1717 "[T]heLochner
Court regarded redistribution... as an essentially private taking.").
49. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1717-18; see, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 385 (1937) (upholds as constitutional a state law establishing minimum wage for
women, despite claim that it undermines freedom of contract).
50. See supra note 42.
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not necessarily either a public value or a naked preference, exogenous to
culture and community, which somehow arises directly from the depths
of self-interested individuals. Moreover, since the legislature alone can-
not construct our culture and community, the legislature cannot deter-
mine independently whether a wealth transfer will be a public or private
value. The Court must contribute to the definition or meaning of a
wealth transfer through its decisions, although the Court cannot do any-
thing it wishes and cannot impose its mere personal preferences. Instead,
the Court's practice of constitutional adjudication interacts with the rest
of the community. For instance, political pressure from the New Deal
strongly influenced the Court to reject Lochner; yet that rejection itself
helped fuel the explosion of the administrative state.52
The strange thing about Sunstein's theory is that he apparently rec-
ognizes the basic point that naked preferences and public values are so-
cial and judicial constructs, yet he refuses to accept its most significant
implications. Sunstein's recognition is evident when he states that the
"selection of public values is made by the judiciary," 53 "the existing so-
cial order should not be regarded as natural but as the product of public
choices,"5 4 and "legal rules.., are part of a system that constitutes, and
does not simply reflect, the social order."' 55 Indeed, in an effort to bolster
his political theory of pursuing public values, Sunstein devotes an entire
article to cataloguing the many factors that may contribute to the "dis-
tortion" of "private" preferences.5 6 Of course, most of the factors that
he believes distort the private preferences are social influences. One pos-
sible implication of this argument, although denied by Sunstein, is that
51. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49.
52. Franklin Roosevelt's landslide victory in the 1936 presidential election together with his
court-packing plan of 1937 probably influenced the Court to reverse its position supporting Lochner
and liberty to contract, which was inconsistent with much of FDR's New Deal legislation. See
Leuchtenberg, FDR's Court-Packing Plan: A Second Life, A Second Death, 1985 DUKE L.J. 673,
673; Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. Cr.
REV. 347; Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1253-62
(1986). Once Lochner was swept away, Congress was free to expand federal power and the federal
administrative state to still unknown boundaries. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (only case after Court's change of position in 1937 in which Court held that Con-
gress had exceeded its power under commerce clause; Court reasoned that Congress had intruded
into state's area of traditional governmental functioning by applying minimum-wage and overtime
provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act to the state) with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overrules National League Of Cities and rejects its limitation on con-
gressional power). See generally B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW (1984) (dis-
cussing the effects of the New Deal on the development of American law).
53. Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1702.
54. Id. at 1729.
55. Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 2, at 1135-36.




undistorted private preferences-preferences exogenous to social influ-
ence-do not exist at all,
Ultimately, Sunstein refuses to take the final step to acknowledge
fully that naked preferences, as well as public values, are not exogenous
to culture and community but are instead social constructs.57 Sunstein
fears that if he takes this step, he will fall over the edge into a bottomless
abyss: He writes:
Lurking beneath the surface... is a serious risk: the recognition
that desires are social constructs, or are distorted by various factors,
may tend to undermine the notion of autonomy altogether. If the ideas
of endogenous preferences and cognitive distortions are carried suffi-
ciently far, it may be impossible to describe a truly autonomous prefer-
ence. No desire is unaffected by social forces. If the notion of
autonomy is abandoned, the realm of permissible legal interferences
may become limitless-hardly a comforting prospect.5 8
Hence, Sunstein closes his eyes, grits his teeth, and resists the
strength and significance of his own insight. If he surrenders and steps
into the abyss, he fears the end of rational decision making in constitu-
tional adjudication. He writes: "This position offers obscure guidance
for constitutional courts; it counsels a general rejection both of neutrality
and of baselines, but at least in some forms, it offers no alternative posi-
tion from which to decide cases."' 59
Sunstein's discussion of the eminent domain clause 60 illustrates his
fear of free-floating and unbounded constitutional adjudication.6 1 A key
issue under this clause is the distinction between a "taking," which re-
quires just compensation, and a "regulation," which requires no compen-
sation. This distinction turns on the premise that a taking involves a
governmental transfer of an individual's private property to the public,
while a regulation does not involve such a transfer. With a regulation, in
other words, the government does not interfere with the ownership of
private property, which theoretically is natural and exogenous to govern-
mental and social influences. 62 The Court addressed this distinction in
Miller v. Schoene. 63 Virginia had passed a law that forced owners of red
57. At one point, Sunstein appears to acknowledge this point fully when he writes: "Politics
cannot... be reduced to the aggregation ot' private interests. Such interests are not preexisting.
They are themselves a product of the political process ...." Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at
1694-95; accord Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 2, at 1549 ("individual preferences should
not be taken as exogenous to politics"). Nonetheless, Sunstein clearly is unwilling to maintain this
recognition and pursue its ramifications for constitutional law.
58. Sunstein, Legal Interference, supra note 2, at 1170.
59. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2, at 905.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. See Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1723-27.
62. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
63. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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cedar trees to cut their trees to protect nearby apple orchards from cedar
rust disease. In holding that the law was a regulation and not a taking,
the Court stated:
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between the
preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever
both existed in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less
a choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing
nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards within its
borders to go on unchecked. 64
As Sunstein acknowledges, this statement of the Court undermines the
premise for distinguishing takings from regulations. The Court suggests
that regardless of what the government did-whether it passed the law or
did not pass the law-it effectively was choosing who would own prop-
erty. Private property is not natural and exogenous to governmental and
social influences, rather it is a governmental and social construct. Conse-
quently, the Court admits in a subsequent case that "quite simply, [it]
has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'jus-
tice and fairness' require that economic injuries &aused by public action
be compensated by the government." 65 As Sunstein suggests, the law of
eminent domain is in "disarray. ' 66 The Court itself has fallen into the
bottomless abyss, at least with regard to this one constitutional clause,
and coherent constitutional theory and adjudication is impossible within
the current rhetorical framework.
Sunstein resists this fall to impending disaster by refusing to ac-
knowledge that naked preferences, as well as public values, are social
constructs. In his view, he maintains the Archimedean point that saves
constitutional law. But closing his eyes and pushing against the strength
of his own insights has not made those insights magically disappear. The
challenge for constitutional theorists today is to accept this insight-that
private and public values are social constructs-and to develop a new
vision of constitutional law and theory around it.
Sunstein instead attempts to relegate this insight to the lawyer's
toolbox-no more than another tool for constructing legal arguments.
67
The toolbox already contains the classical rhetorical tools (constitutional
text, framers' intent, and stare decisis68), and the post-realist tools (policy
64. Id. at 279.
65. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
66. Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1726.
67. The idea for this metaphor originated with my professor in Contract Law, Jon Jacobson,
who referred to promissory estoppel in contracts as a tool in the lawyer's toolbox.
68. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARv.
L. Rav. 129 (1893); see, eg., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (Court should do no more
than look to the language of the Constitution and intent of the Framers when determining the consti-
tutionality of legislation); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (in developing the
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argument, balancing test, and constitutional theory69), and now Sunstein
adds a postmodern tool-private and public values are social constructs.
We use this tool, for example, to argue that Lochner was wrong: the
Court mistakenly believed that both the common law and the market
status quo were natural and exogenous to governmental and social influ-
ences, but, as Sunstein informs us, they actually were social constructs. 70
When we finish using the tool to criticize the case, though, we merely
return it to the toolbox to use another day.
The recognition that both private and public values are social con-
structs, however, cannot be relegated to the toolbox for occasional use.
For just as Sunstein fears, this recognition undermines constitutional ju-
risprudence as we have known it. Sunstein and traditional constitutional
law rest on the bedrock concept that either we have some Archimedean
point on which to ground constitutional objectivity, or we have uncon-
strained subjectivity. Apparently for Sunstein, no other possibilities ex-
ist. He is trapped in the Cartesian either/or:7' either we have knowledge
that is objective and certain, or we have no knowledge at all. And consti-
tutional knowledge can be objective and certain only if it is based on
some readily identifiable object that is exogenous to society. That readily
identifiable object, for Sunstein, is the naked preference: an unadulter-
ated value arising directly from the depths of individual self-interest and
independent of social influences. Without the naked preference-the
readily identifiable object-constitutional knowledge is impossible, and
constitutional adjudication is no more than free-floating and unprinci-
pled arbitrariness.
doctrine of judicial review, Chief Justice Marshall constructed arguments based largely on the lan-
guage of the constitutional text and the structure of our constitutional government). See generally
Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1987) (identifying five types of arguments that are typically used in constitutional adjudication).
69. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 842-49 (1935) (courts should avoid justifying decisions by relying on legal fictions such as loca-
tion of a corporation or status of a labor union as a person; courts should instead focus on likely
actual consequences of its various possible decisions, choosing decision that will, on balance, lead to
best result for society); Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1252-54 (1931) (arguing that should look to policy concerns). See generally
Fallon, supra note 68, at 1189 (identifies five types of arguments that are typically used in constitu-
tional adjudication).
70. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, supra note 2; Naked Preferences, supra note 1, at 1717-18.
71. Descartes radically transformed western thought by focusing on a thinking subject in a
mechanistic external world. The Cartesian separation of the subject from the objects of the external
world leads to the Cartesian either/or: either perception and knowledge are rooted in the subject-
and are thus relativistic and subjective-or perception and knowledge are rooted in the mechanistic
external world-and are thus certain and objective. For further discussion of the Cartesian either/
or, see R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 1-7.
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The overarching challenge for current constitutional theory is to
move beyond the either/or, to overcome the fear of the maelstrom of
social and cultural subjectivity. 72 Knowledge must be viewed as the un-
derstanding of a practice that is defined by the given, though contingent,
structures of its paradigms. This understanding is not purely subjective
or relative: paradigmatic structures are real. That is, even though these
structures are socially constructed, they nonetheless exist as they shape
and limit human experience and perception.73 But since the structures
exist only through human action and communication-through human
practices-knowledge is no more objective and certain than it is subjec-
tive and relative. 74 In other words, to move beyond the either/or, we
must accept that knowledge can exist without being objective and cer-
tain.75 Constitutional knowledge thus is possible without grounding in
preexisting and exogenous private values. The task, therefore, for the
modem constitutional theorist is to recognize that naked preferences are
socially constructed, acknowledge that this insight undermines tradi-
tional constitutional jurisprudence, and consequently reconstruct our vi-
sion of constitutional theory and adjudication.
IV. TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The historical roots of Sunstein's theory provide a source for the
possible reconstruction of constitutional law. As discussed previously,
Sunstein's theory of judicial review can be understood as a combination
of Alexander Bickel's early theory of judicial review and of John Hart
Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement. 76 Bickel argued that the
Court injects principles or enduring values into the governmental pro-
cess, while Ely argued that the Court only polices the political process.
Sunstein combines the two theories and argues that the Court polices the
72. James Boyd White writes:
[I]n our actual lives we show that we know how to read and speak, to live with language,
texts, and each other, and to do so with considerable confidence. But to do this we must
accept the conditions on which we live. When we discover that we have in this world no
earth or rock to stand or walk upon but only shifting sea and sky and wind, the mature
response is not to lament the loss of fixity but to learn to sail.
J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 278 (1984); see R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 31;
Rabinow & Sullivan, supra note 42; R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 45-61
(1979); cf Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105-09 (1981) (fundamental rights controversy of
constitutional law is essentially contradictory because of inherent tension within Madisonian democ-
racy between individual rights and majority rule).
73. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
75. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, supra note 38, at 87; R. RORTY, supra note 72, at 170-81,
315-19.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
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legislative process, but in so doing, it insures that the legislative process
pursues public values and not naked preferences.
A more appealing description of judicial review, however, arises
from a combination of Sunstein's theory with an aspect of Bickel's theory
that Sunstein rejected. Sunstein's vision of the political process-deliber-
ative democracy creating or constructing public values-is compelling;
however his vision of judicial review is partially but significantly flawed.
Although the Court should, as Sunstein suggests, police the political pro-
cess, naked preferences are not exogenous to social influence or readily
identifiable by the Court. Bickel's point that the Court itself injects val-
ues into government must be reintroduced in constitutional theory.77
Supplementing Bickel's theory with the postmodern insight that private
and public values are social constructs turns us towards a reconstructed
vision of constitutional adjudication: The Court participates in the delib-
erative process of constructing and reconstructing the values of the soci-
ety, and moreover, the Court participates in the process of defining and
redefining those values as either private or public. 78
This alternative vision of constitutional adjudication, it should be
noted, is not colored by pure subjectivism; the Court is not merely en-
forcing its own personal values or preferences. The Court is but one par-
ticipant in an ever-continuing process of constructing and reconstructing
values, culture, and community. The other participants in the process
and the values already given to the Court always limit its vision and
understanding of the past, present, and future. Culture and community
limit and constrain all participants, including the Court, even though all
participants constantly construct and reconstruct culture and commu-
nity.79 In particular, certain contingent paradigmatic structures consti-
77. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. Since I am suggesting that Sunstein's notion of
policing the political process is appropriate and since Ely's representation-reinforcement theory is
the historical foundation for that aspect of Sunstein's theory, I am effectively incorporating Ely's
theory into my suggested alternative approach to judicial review. Thus, the Court should police the
political process to clear the channels of political change and to insure the representation of minori-
ties, see supra text accompanying notes 10-11, although as both Sunstein and I argue, the Court must
do much more.
78. Cf Fiss; Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (Courts, as well as
other societal institutions and individuals, should have a voice in giving specific meaning to the
ambiguous values embodied in the Constitution,); Michelman, Self-Government, supra note 2, at 75
(justices are the "oracles" of the law); Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: The Uneasy
Case for a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987) (the
Court must maintain a boundary between public and private spheres).
79. Rabinow and Sullivan write:
The interpretive turn refocuses attention on the concrete varieties of cultural meaning, in
their particularity and complex texture, but without falling into the traps of historicism or
cultural relativism in their classical forms. For the human sciences both the object of
investigation-the web of language, symbol, and institutions that constitutes significa-
tion-and the tools by which investigation is carried out share inescapably the same perva.
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tute the practice of constitutional adjudication and thus constrain the
Court's possibilities when deciding constitutional issues. For example,
under current constitutional practice the Court usually articulates rea-
sons for its decisions,80 and those reasons supposedly reflect values that
are presently and generally perceived to be public values. Thus, the
Court cannot decide a case by stating: "The defendant wins because this
result personally profits five of the justices." But the Court can state:
"The defendant wins because this result increases political equality
throughout society." The recognition that the current paradigmatic
structures of constitutional adjudication constrain the Court does not,
however, undermine the conclusion that the Court's opinions themselves
reconstitute societal values, whether public or private.81
How might this alternative vision of judicial review work in the con-
text of equal protection? Consider the case of Warren McCleskey. Mc-
sive context that is the human world. All this by no means to exalt "subjective" awareness
over a presumed detached scientific objectivity, in the manner of nineteenth-century Ro-
manticism. Quite the contrary, the interpretive approach denies and overcomes the almost
de rigueur opposition of subjectivity and objectivity.
Rabinow & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 4-5; see Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Post-
structuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 135, 152 (1985) ("Since [a] text comes to be only in an
act of understanding, the distinction between the way it is 'in itself' before being read and the way it
appears in an interpretation is a false reification of the process of understanding."); Williams, Critical
Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
429 (1987) (argues for a conception of law based on a new epistemology that rejects the dichotomy
between a transcendental objectivism and a relativistic subjectivism); supra notes 38-48 and accom-
panying text.
The complex interaction between culture and human action and expression plunges us into the
hermeneutic circle. At the level of reading a written text, the hermeneutic circle focuses on the
interaction between the whole text and its constituent parts. A whole text cannot be understood
unless one first understands its constituent parts, yet those constituent parts cannot be understood
unless one first understands how those parts fit within the whole. Richard Palmer writes: "[I]n
order to read, it is necessary to understand in advance what will be said, and yet this understanding
must come from the reading." R. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS 16 (1969). This hermeneutic circle
maintains its hold upon us when we seek to understand text-analogues-any meaningful human
actions. Thus, the cultural anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, writes: "Hopping back and forth be-
tween the whole conceived through the parts which actualize it and the parts conceived through the
whole which motivates tlem, we seek to turn them, by a sort of intellectual perpetual motion, into
explications of one another." Geertz, From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropo-
logical Understanding, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE-A READER 239 (P. Rabinow & W. Sul-
livan eds. 1979). See R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 131-39; R. RORTY, supra note 72, at 318-19;
Rabinow & Sullivan, supra note 42, at 6-7.
80. This structure of constitutional adjudication was initially focused upon by the "legal pro-
cess" scholars of the 1950's. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
81. Indeed, the effects of a Court opinion ripple throughout society. For example, the Court's
articulation in its opinions of reasons that reflect values that are perceived to be public is likely to
increase the actual pursuit of those perceived public values. See J. ELSTER, supra note 40, at 36.
Furthermore, the Court's opinions not only reconstitute societal values, but also reconstitute the
practice of constitutional adjudication. That is, each time the Court decides a constitutional case,
the opinion contributes to the evolving paradigmatic structures of constitutional practice.
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Cleskey had been convicted of murder in a Georgia state court and
sentenced to death. He petitioned for habeas corpus, alleging that the
Georgia capital sentencing statute was racially discriminatory and thus
violated the equal protection clause. McCleskey presented striking sta-
tistical evidence that strongly suggested that the two most important
facts leading to his death sentence were his race-African-American-
and his victim's race-white. In the Supreme Court's opinion in McCles-
key v. Kemp, 82 the Court summarized this evidence: "[T]he death pen-
alty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and
white victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white vic-
tims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and
3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims."'8 3 De-
spite this evidence, the Court held that McCleskey had failed to prove
intentional discrimination; the Court therefore applied only rational basis
review and held the law constitutional.8 4 Translating this result into
Sunstein's language, the Court found that McCleskey had failed to prove
the law reflected a mere naked preference; instead, the law reflected a
public value, and the Court thus upheld it.
Under the proposed alternative approach to constitutional adjudica-
tion, the Court's analysis in McCleskey did not go far enough. As Sun-
stein argues, the Court should police the political process, and in so
doing the Court should assure that the legislature deliberated in the pur-
suit of public values. But the Court must recognize that it too deliberates
and defines public and private values. The Court cannot merely search
for and readily identify a preexisting and exogenous naked preference
because no such preference exists. All preferences, whether naked or
public, are social and judicial constructs. Thus, in McCleskey the Court
should have focused more clearly on its own role in interpreting social
events and defining acceptable values. In doing so, the Court should
have considered the potential meanings that alternative decisions would
have within our culture and community. For instance, the Court in Mc-
Cleskey could have stated that any law with such a clearly discrimina-
tory effect cannot reflect the common good-it must reflect a naked
preference. Our community, through the Court, can refuse to define it-
self as able to accept that such a discriminatory law could fulfill any
public value: the conclusion is that a law with sharply discriminatory
effects reflects unacceptable values (or naked preferences) and no more.
82. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
83. Id. at 286; see id. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 297-299. The Court also rejected claims that the capital sentencing scheme was ad-
ministered in a racially discriminatory manner, id. at 289-98, and that it violated the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment, id. at 298-319; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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If the Court had reached this conclusion by following the alternative ap-
proach-by self-consciously interpreting and defining values-it would
have communicated a different (more egalitarian?) message or meaning
to the legal and broader social communities than the one the Court com-
municated implicitly by its actual decision. And although the Court
need not necessarily reach this particular conclusion-I am not claiming'
this conclusion is objective and neutral-the Court is, as discussed above,
constrained in its vision and possible conclusions because it decides con-
stitutional issues within the contingent structures of accepted constitu-
tional practices. 85 To use an extreme example, the legal and broader
communities would not accept, and the Court would not envision, a judi-
cial finding that death sentences should be determined by the flip of a
coin. 86 Nonetheless, the Court cannot avoid its role in the community by
claiming that it merely polices the legislative process for preexisting and
identifiable naked preferences: the Court's decision contributes to the
definition of what preferences are acceptable and unacceptable. The
Court, in other words, necessarily constitutes and reconstitutes values,
culture, and community.8 7
Plessy v. Ferguson88 and Brown v. Board of Education89 starkly illus-
trate the significance of the Court's role in the community within the
context of equal protection doctrine. In Plessy, decided in 1896, the
Court upheld a Louisiana statute that required railroad companies to
provide separate but equal accommodations for African-American and
85. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
86. Ronald Dworkin writes: "Every community has paradigms of law, propositions that in
practice cannot be challenged without suggesting either corruption or ignorance." R. DWORKIN,
supra note 17, at 88; see id. at 228-38. My approach partly corresponds with the approach that
Dworkin takes to judicial decision making in Law's Empire. R. DWORKIN, supra note 17. Insofar
as Dworkin argues that we should take an interpretive approach to all judicial decision making,
including constitutional adjudication, I agree with him. I also agree that this insight ultimately must
be supplemented by a particular interpretive theory. I do not, however, agree that Dworkin's inter-
pretive theory of "law as integrity" is necessarily the best interpretive theory. The presentation of an
alternative interpretive theory is beyond the scope of this essay. For one possible approach, see
Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in J. BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEU-
TICS 181-211 (1980) (philosophical hermeneutics or interpretivism must be supplemented with a
meta-hermeneutics in which truth is based on consensus in an ideal speech situation).
87. For a critical view of the prospects for African-Americans of a civic republican approach to
politics, see Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609 (1988).
More generally, danger exists whenever white scholars write about constitutional rights and minori-
ties: loud voices of "imperial scholars" may drown out the voices of minorities, and necessary socie-
tal change may occur too slowly. Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil
Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984). On the other hand, at least one feminist scholar
has tied the rebirth of civil republicanism to the feminist voice in jurisprudence. Sherry, Civic Virtue
and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
88. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
89. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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white passengers. The Court stated that the separation of African-Amer-
icans and whites was a "public good": 90 in Sunstein's terminology, the
Court found that forced legal separation was a public value, not a naked
preference. Justice Harlan's dissent, however, rejected this finding.91 In
so doing, Justice Harlan emphasized the meaning of the Court's decision
for society:
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimu-
late aggressions, more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted
rights of colored citizens, but will encourage the belief that it is possi-
ble, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes
which the people of the United States had in view when they adopted
the [Reconstruction] amendments of the Constitution .... What can
more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and per-
petuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments,
which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens are so infer-
ior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches
occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real meaning
of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.92
The history of the plight of African-Americans in American society
unfortunately has proven the prescience of Justice Harlan. Professor
Derrick Bell writes that after Plessy "blacks encountered even more diffi-
culty in obtaining from the lower courts relief from serious racial inequi-
ties."'93 Focusing on education, Bell documents the injustices legitimized
and engendered by Plessy:
[L]itigation could not bring equality for blacks under the easily evaded
"separate but equal" standard, in a society whose attitude toward the
education of blacks ranged from apathy to outright hostility. In 1915,
South Carolina was spending an average of $23.76 on the education of
each white child and $2.91 on that of each black child. As late as
1931, six Southern states (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, and
North and South Carolina) spent less than one-third as much for black
children as for whites, and ten years later this figure had risen to only
44 percent. At the time of the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, the South as a whole was spending on the average $165 a
year for a white pupil, and $115 for a black.94
Obviously, the rule of Plessy enervated the equal protection clause,
which remained largely ineffective until the Court finally decided in 1954
Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.95 Brown held, of course, that
90. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
91. Id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 373 (2d ed. 1980); see id. at 29-38, 83-91,
364-74.
94. Id. at 373.
95. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal,"' 96 or in Sun-
stein's words, the separation of African-Americans and whites is not a
public value, but rather it is a naked preference of whites. The meaning
of Brown has been as significant to modem society as the meaning of
Plessy had been earlier: the illegality of state laws mandating racial
apartheid is now undisputed.97
Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy and the transition from Plessy to
Brown underscore the two distinctive aspects of the recommended alter-
native approach to constitutional adjudication. First, the question
whether a particular value is a naked preference or a public good does
not have a preexisting and self-evident answer. Public and private values
are social constructs emerging from social relations and actions that are
interpreted by the Court. Second, the Court itself, through the practice
of constitutional adjudication, contributes to the definition of values and
their characterization as public goods or naked preferences: the Court
creates meaning and values through its interpretations. The significance
of Plessy reverberated throughout American society for more than sixty
years, just as the significance of the meaning of Brown still manifests
itself today. 98 Thus the Court's constitutional decisions are part of the
dialectic of social change.
Although Plessy and Brown are extreme examples because they held
unusually important significance for American society, all constitutional
decisions have some significance for some part of society. I do not mean
to suggest that the Court alone shapes society, or even that the Court is
the primary force for social change. To the contrary, the Court's deci-
sions usually reflect values and perceptions that a large segment of the
96. Id. at 495.
97. See D. BELL, supra note 93, at 377-97; Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 2, at 1523-
24. Robert L. Carter writes:
Brown v. Board of Education fathered a social upheaval the extent and consequences
of which cannot even now be measured with certainty. It marks a divide in American life.
The holding that the segregation of blacks in the nation's public schools is a denial of the
Constitution's command implies that all racial segregation in American public life is inva-
lid-that all racial discrimination sponsored, supported, or encouraged by government is
unconstitutional. As a result of this seminal decision, blacks had the right to use the main,
not the separate, waiting room; to choose any seat in the bus; to relax in the public parks
on the same terms as any other member of the community. This and more became their
birthright under the Constitution.
Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REv. 237, 246 (1968); accord J. WILKIN-
SON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 6 (1979). I do not mean to suggest that Brown has successfully
eliminated segregation and racism in America; this is far from the truth. As Robert L. Carter sug-
gested, racial discrimination is illegal in public life, but the same is not true in private life. See D.
BELL, supra note 93, at 397-457; Carter, supra, at 243-46; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimina-
tion Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L.
REv. 1049 (1978).
98. See supra notes 93, 97 and accompanying text.
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society already has accepted at least partially.99 Nonetheless, Plessy and
Brown illustrate that the Court is a powerful institution within society,
strongly influencing the values that much of the community either ac-
cepts as worthy or rejects as unworthy. The Court's practice of constitu-
tional adjudication is a conversation with the rest of society that requires
the Court simultaneously to search for and to create meaning. That the
Court sometimes generates heated debates, such as in the current battle
over abortion and Roe v. Wade, to0 only underscores its significant role in
constituting and reconstituting values, culture, and community.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Sunstein argues that the legislative process should be char-
acterized by a deliberative pursuit of public values. The Court therefore,
according to Sunstein's theory of judicial review, should police the polit-
ical process, ensuring that legislative actions arise from actual public val-
ues, not from naked preferences. Naked preferences are preexisting
private interests, exogenous to social influences and autonomously cho-
sen by individuals. The problem with Sunstein's theory is that prefer-
ences are never naked: they are always socially constructed.
This recognition turns us towards a reconstructed vision of constitu-
tional law. The Court and others, including the legislatures, are partici-
pants in a continuing conversation, deliberating and constructing and
reconstructing values, culture, and community. Consequently, in judi-
cial review, the Court should police the legislative process, and that legis-
lative process should be a deliberative discussion that defines and
redefines values. But the Court must do more. It also must construct
and reconstruct values, culture, and community, thereby contributing to
the conversation as it simultaneously monitors the contributions of
others.
99. See D. BELL, supra note 93, at 92-93, 374-81; Carter, supra note 97, at 237-38.
100. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see, eg., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo. A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (argues that recognizing a woman's right to choose whether to have an
abortion is an unjustified substantive value choice by the Court).
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